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This paper shows that best-price guarantees can enhance welfare, in contrast to findings in recent 
literature.  While a high-quality monopolist can signal its quality strictly through high prices, using 
both price and a best-price guarantee may allow the firm to signal its quality with a smaller price 
distortion.  A low-quality monopolist will not mimic its high-quality counterpart by offering a 
best-price guarantee, because the accompanying restrictions are too costly.  Best-price guarantees 
are similar to money-back guarantees and other more general contracts in their ability to allow less 
costly signaling.  The welfare enhancing capabilities of these contracts imply that the antitrust 
authorities should regard them more favorably. 
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Best-price Guarantees as a Quality Signal 
I. Introduction 
The notion that uninformed consumers can infer a product’s quality from its price was 
recognized long before economists developed the fundamentals of signaling games.  However, game 
theoretic formalization has shed light on how firms can make signaling work.  For example, the 
manufacturer of a high quality good can signal quality through a higher price than would be optimal if 
consumers were fully informed about product quality.  Signaling in this manner is credible because, 
though high prices reduce profits for both low and high quality firms, a low-quality manufacturer suffers 
greater losses than its high-quality counterpart.1  Thus, a low-quality firm will not find it profitable to 
mimic a high-quality firm’s pricing strategy. 
Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) have established 
the foregoing point through various means.  Bagwell and Riordan's model, in particular, shows that price 
signaling diminishes in strategic value as consumers gain information over time about a non-durable 
good's quality.  They do not consider mechanisms that may credibly allow the firm to disseminate this 
information more quickly, such as a best-price guarantee.   
                                                                 
1 "Quality" may take different meanings.  Sometimes, quality refers to the likelihood that a product will be 
defective.  Here, quality refers to consumers' tastes and preferences between similar goods.  For example, Coca-Cola  
may be viewed by many consumers as being a higher quality product than Check Cola. 
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Best-price provisions, or most-favored customer contracts (MFCCs), are sales contracts that 
specify a rebate for customers when the firm charges certain prices for its product.2  While these 
contracts take on a variety of forms, in this paper I examine retroactive two-party MFCC, which 
require the firm to pay the customer a penalty should the firm lower its price during some specified 
period. The penalty is usually the difference between the original price and the “sale” price (but may also 
have an alternate specification).  In effect, the MFCC commits the firm to not lower its own price in the 
future.  These contracts may be valid for any length of time and are generally easily enforced. 
MFCCs may be used in a variety of ways.  Cooper (1986) models the use of retroactive 
two-party MFCCs by Bertrand oligopolists, selling products of known quality.  Cooper shows that at 
least one firm will unilaterally adopt an MFCC in equilibrium.3  If a firm offers a MFCC, its rival can 
profitably charge higher prices, even without offering an MFCC itself.  The MFCC adopter, in effect, 
communicates to its rival its willingness to (tacitly) collude, and burns its bridges as proof.  Provided the 
rival does not charge too low a price, the adopter will not lower its own price. 
In a similar vein, Butz (1991) shows that a monopolist producer of a durable good of known 
quality will offer a retroactive two-party MFCC in order to commit credibly to not lowering price in the 
future.  Without such a contract, the monopolist has incentive to increase output in each period, 
imposing additional costs on its previous customers.  The monopolist's inability to commit to limiting the 
                                                                 
2Contemporaneous two-party MFCCs commit the firm to eschew price discrimination amongst its customers 
within each period.  Contemporaneous three-party MFCC commit the firm to match the best price offered by its 
competitors.  A three-party retroactive MFCC commits the firm to pay previous customers a rebate should they find 
that a competitor had a lower price. 
3 Neilson and Winter (1993) show that both firms will adopt a MFCC only under the undesirable assumption that 
demand for one firm's product is less responsive to changes in its own price than to changes in its rival’s price. 
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good's stock induces consumers to reduce their willingness to pay for the good.  MFCCs allow the 
monopolist to commit credibly to higher prices and retain all of its monopoly power.4 
This paper studies the use of a retroactive two-party best-price provision, and a more general 
form of contractual commitment, as part of a multivariable signal of product quality. Consumers’ 
uncertainty about product quality induces firms producing high–quality products to distinguish 
themselves by adopting MFCCs.  As a result, welfare is greater than if MFCCs had not been adopted. 
 This result contrasts sharply with the results from Cooper (1986) and Butz (1991), in which consumers 
were fully informed about product quality and the MFCC was welfare reducing.   
Following Bagwell (1991), I assume a monopolist is either high-quality (type H) or low-quality 
(type L).  The firm learns its randomly determined type prior to any pricing decisions, but consumers are 
uninformed about the firm’s product quality in period 1.  They become fully informed before making any 
purchases in period 2. 
The type H firm distinguishes itself from the type L firm by offering a first period price that is 
higher than its full-information monopoly price – the price it would find most profitable to charge when 
consumers are fully informed.  I show that offering a best-price guarantee allows the high-quality 
producer to signal its type at a lower price, because a low-quality firm is unwilling to offer a best-price 
guarantee at any price greater than its own full-information price.  If the low-quality firm maintains a high 
                                                                 
4 Contemporaneous MFCCs appear to be less powerful devices for  credibly committing to maintain high prices.  
Besanko and Lyon (1992) posit a model similar to Cooper's, in which the oligopolist offers a contemporaneous MFCC 
in order to tacitly collude with its rival.  This type of provision is not necessarily adopted by any firm in an 
equilibrium since price discrimination is profitable if the high value customers are numerous enough.  Moreover, the 
empirical work of Crocker and Lyon (1994) shows that the three-party MFCCs used in long-term contracts tend to 
facilitate efficient price adjustment rather than collusion.  These types of MFCCs place no restrictions on the firm's 
ability to lower its own prices, but instead serve to limit its ability to raise prices.  Within the context of my model, 
only the ability of the firm to cut its own price is important. 
(continued…) 
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price, then its sales will suffer in the future once consumers learn the true quality.  If it lowers its price in 
the future, then it will be able to sell its product, but will have to pay the penalty stipulated in the MFCC. 
 Thus, the high-quality firm can use an MFCC to distinguish itself from its low-quality counterpart, and 
the associated lower prices raise welfare.5 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section II characterizes the solution with only price as a 
signal.  Section III shows that the use of a best-price provision allows the high-quality monopolist to 
signal at a lower price, thus raising welfare.  Section IV examines the signaling game with a more general 
penalty contract.  Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Classic price signaling  
The basic model is from Bagwell (1991), with the exception that the monopolist's quality choice 
is exogenous.  Consider a 2-period model in which consumers purchase a non-durable good from a 
monopolist.6  Nature determines the quality of the good prior to any actions by the players. Let iÎ{L, 
H} index quality.  Demand for the good of quality i in period t is given by ),( tt bpD , where pt is price,  
btÎ[0, 1] is the probability with which consumers believe the good to be type i=H and t indexes time. 
),( tt bpD  is decreasing in pt and increasing in bt.  Let ci be the marginal cost of the good of quality i, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
  5MFCCs are an effective signal because they are a credible, legally binding commitment to a particular price 
level.  Riordan (1986) also recognizes the importance of commitment in a quality signaling game.  However, the 
commitment mechanism in Riordan is exogenous.  In contrast, the choice of adopting a MFCC as a commitment 
mechanism is endogenous to my model. 
  6 Best-price guarantees are frequently used in non-durable goods settings. For example, retailers offer MFCCs 
to customers as protection (on durable and non-durable goods) from missing a sale.  Also, consider a scenario in 
which consumers may be indifferent between purchasing today and tomorrow (at today’s price), or have discount 
factors very close to one.  Then non-durable goods begin to approach being durable goods, in the limit.  By viewing 
the model in the present setting, we can avoid complications resulting from the Coase Conjecture and from the 
monopolist’s need to hold periodic sales when the number of consumers with low willingness-to-pay becomes large. 
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with cL<cH.  Let dÎ[0, 1] be the discount factor.  Let p~  be the highest price for which any consumer 
would be willing to pay for the monopolist's product – implying 0)1~( =,pD .  In period 1, consumers are 
uninformed as to the quality of the monopolist's product.  In period 2, consumers are fully informed 
about the product's quality. 
The type L firm’s profit function for this game is given as 
 ).000()00( 211 ,,,c,p+,,b,c,p LL PP d  (1) 
Profits in period one are a function of the price in period one, the type L firm’s marginal cost, and 
consumers’ beliefs about the product’s quality. 7  Profits in period two, when quality is known, are a 
function of the price in period two and the type L firm’s marginal cost, and are discounted 
appropriately.  Similarly, the type H firm’s profit function for this game is given as 
 .,,,c,p+,,b,c,p HH )001()00( 211 PP d  (2) 
Assume that for all "(c, b) ( )0,0,,, bcpP  is strictly concave in p, with a well–defined maximizer 
( )0,0,,bcp  at which profit is positive:  ( )( ) .00,0,,,0,0,, >P bcbcp   Further assume that ( )0,0,,bcp  is 
increasing in c "(c, b), that is .0>-=P ppc D   Also assume that "(c, b) ( )0,0,,bcp  is increasing in b, 
that is ( ) .0>+-=P bpbb DDcp  
Let 
 ,,,,cp,argmax=,,,cp LL )000()000( P  (3) 
and 
                                                                 
7 The last two arguments of the profit function represent whether or not an MFCC has been offered.  These 
arguments take the value of zero in equations (1) and (2) and are defined in Section III. 
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 ( )001,)001( ,,,cpargmax=,,,cp HH P  (4) 
be the full-information (first-best) monopoly prices for the low-quality firm and the high-quality firm 
respectively.  Note that ( ) ( )0,0,1,0,0,0, HL cpcp <  because ),( tt bpD increases in bt. 
Because consumers do not know the firm’s true type in period 1, a type H firm would like to 
signal its type through price.  Assume 
 ( ) ( )001,)001(000,)000( ,,c,,,,cp<,,c,,,,cp LHLL PP , (5) 
which implies that a type L firm would find it profitable to offer the high-quality, full-information price if 
doing so induced consumers to believe that its true type were H.  Consequently, when consumers are 
uninformed, a type H firm cannot signal its type using its first-best price. 
I use backwards induction to find the equilibrium prices charged by each type of firm in this 
game.  In period 2, when all consumers are informed about the product’s quality, the firm will set its 
price at its full-information level.  Equilibrium profits in period 2 are ( )( )0,0,0,,0,0,0, LL ccpP  and 
( )( )0,0,1,,0,0,1, HH ccpP  for the type L firm and the type H firm respectively. 
Now consider period 1, when all consumers are uninformed about the product's quality.   In a 
separating equilibrium, the type H firm selects a price such that a type L firm will charge its full-
information price and will not find it profitable to mimic.  Any price, P* offered by H in a separating 
equilibrium must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint: 
 ( ) ( ).,,,c,,,,cp,,,c,P LLL* 000)000(001 P£P  (6)  
The price P* that satisfies (the quadratic) equation (6) with equality has two roots, 
 P<,,,cp<,,,cp<P HL )001()000(  (7) 
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Figures 1 and 2 show the profit functions for each type of firm and the prices which satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint for linear and constant elasticity demand curves, respectively.  This leads to the 
following theorem, which is nearly identical to the theorem in Bagwell (1991). 
Theorem 1:  There exists a unique Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion equilibrium outcome in which 
)001(21 ,,,cp=p,P=p H  for the type H firm and  )000(21 ,,,cp=p=p L  for the type L firm. 
The proof to the Theorem is analogous to the proof of the theorem in Bagwell (1991) and is not 
formally presented here. 
A manufacturer of a high–quality good is able to signal its type effectively with the high price 
because a low-quality manufacturer cannot as easily accommodate the reduction in output brought on 
by higher prices.  In a separating equilibrium, the type L firm does not distort its price and the type H 
firm sets a price such that equation (6) is satisfied, ( )P,Pp Ï1 .  The high-quality firm will seek to 
minimize the distortion from its full-information equilibrium price and quantity.  The type H firm will 
therefore prefer to set its first-period price at P=p1  because 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) .>,PD-,PDc-c
=,,,c,P-,,,c,P+,,,c,P-,,,c,P
=,,,c,P-,,,c,P
LH
LLHH
HH
0)1()1(
001001001001
001001
PPPP
PP
 (8) 
This result emanates from the single-crossing property: 
 
( ) ( )
.
p
,,,cp,>
p
,,,cp, LH
¶
P¶
¶
P¶ 000001
 (9) 
As seen in Figures 1 and 2, a type H firm is less affected by higher prices than a type L firm.  Profits 
drop much faster as prices rise above ( )0,0,1,Hcp  for a type L firm than for a type H firm, as the 
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figures indicate.  Consumers, realizing this, know that only a high-quality firm could offer the high price, 
and they update their beliefs accordingly. 
III. Signaling with Best-price Guarantees 
Now consider the two-period game in which the monopolist may adopt a MFCC at the start of 
the first period.  As before, consumers are fully informed about the firm's type only in period 2.  
However, the firm's profits in the second period now depend upon the price and consumers' beliefs 
from period 1.   
Let mt=1 indicate that the firm has adopted a MFCC in period t.  Let mt=0 indicate that the 
firm did not adopt a MFCC in period t.  Let f represent the size of the penalty stipulated in the MFCC. 
 Per period profits for firm i are 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .m-b,pDc-p=,m,b,c,p -tttit-ttit ff 11P  (10) 
Let the MFCC stipulate the following penalty function: 
 ( )
( ) ( )
ïî
ï
í
ì
£ ppif0
p>pifb,pDp-p
=b,p,p
t-t
t-t-t-tt-t
-tt-t
1
1111
11f . (11) 
 Total profits at date t for firm i are: 
 ( ),,m,b,c,p
T
t
-ttit
)-(tå P fd 11  (12) 
 where dÎ[0, 1] is the discount factor. 
A type L firm’s profits are 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b,p,pm-,pDc-p+b,pDc-p LL 121122111 0 fdd , (13) 
while a type H firm’s profits are 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).b,p,pm-,pDc-p+b,pDc-p HH 121122111 1 fdd  (14) 
Once again, I use backwards induction to solve for equilibrium prices.  In period 2, consumers 
know the firm’s quality.  However, unlike the game with the restriction m1=0, the profit maximizing 
period 2 price depends upon whether or not a MFCC was adopted in period 1 and the period 1 price. 
 If m1=0, then there was no MFCC and each type of firm will offer its full-information price in period 2: 
 )0,0,0,(2 Lcpp =  if quality is low, and )0,0,1,(2 Hcpp =  if quality is high.  Likewise, if m1=1 and p1 
is less than or equal to the full-information price, then in period 2 each type of firm will offer its full 
information price because the MFCC penalty is zero.   However, if m1=1, and p1 > p2, then the firm will 
have to pay a penalty in period 2.  Since the penalty is dependent upon the value of p2, each type of firm 
faces a constrained optimization problem in the second period.  The type L firm solves 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,>p-ps.t.
b,pDp-p-,pDc-p L
p
0
0max
21
112122
2  (15) 
 
while the type H firm solves 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.>p-ps.t.
b,pDp-p-,pDc-p H
p
0
1max
21
112122
2  (16) 
Let  
 ( ) ( ) ,|,,,c,pargmax=,,,cp ppLLm 211010 1 ³P ff  (17)  
 
be the solution to the constrained optimization problem in equation (15) and let 
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 ( ) ( ) ,|,,,c,pargmax=,,,cp ppHHm 211111 2 ³P ff  (18) 
 
be the solution to the constrained optimization problem in equation (16).  
The optimal second period price for a type L firm is summarized below and in Figure 3: 
[ ]
( ]
( ]
( )
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
ï
ï
í
ì
¥Î
Î
Î
Î
==
.),(~,
)(~),(,
,)(,,
,,0,
11
111
111
1
2
)0,0,0,(
),1,0,(
)0,0,0,(
)0,0,0,()0,0,0,(
),1,0,(
bppp
bpbppp
bpppp
ppp
pp
LL
LLLm
LL
LL
L
c
c
c
cc
c ff
 (19) 
 
where  )}10({}{)( 2121 f,,,cp=pp=p=bp LmL Ç  and 
.,,,cp=p,,,cp=p=bp LLmL )}000({)}10({)(
~
221 Çf                                                                          
     
The optimal second period price for a type H firm is:   
 
[ ]
( ]
( ]
( )ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
í
ì
¥Î
Î
Î
Î
==
.),(~),0,0,1,(
,)(~),(),,1,1,(
,)(),0,0,1,(,
,)0,0,1,(,0
1),0,0,1,(
),1,1,(
11
111
111
2
bppcp
bpbppcp
bpcppp
cppcp
cpp
HH
HHHm
HH
HH
H
f
f  (20) 
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Where { } { })11()( 2121 f,,,cp=pp=p=bp HmH Ç  and 
{ } { }.,,,cp=p,,,cp=p=bp HHmH )001()11()(~ 221 Çf  
Figure 3 shows the second period pricing rule for a type L firm when the firm adopted a MFCC 
in period one, as given by equation (19) (the pricing rule for a type H firm looks similar). As p2 
approaches ( )0,0,0,Lcp  from above and below, period 2 profits are increasing when p1 £ 
( )0,0,0,Lcp .  For p1 greater, but not much greater, than ( )0,0,0,Lcp  the type L firm finds it most 
profitable to set p2=p1 and pay no penalty.  p1 is small enough such that the number of consumers who 
are covered by the MFCC is relatively large.  The firm prefers earning lower profits in period 2 to 
offering a lower p2 and paying a large penalty.  As p1 gets larger, however, the number of consumers 
covered by the MFCC becomes smaller.  Also, as p1 gets larger, p2= p1 becomes further from 
( )0,0,0,Lcp , and so reversion to the full–information price becomes relatively more attractive.  When 
,bpp L )( 11 ³ the firm prefers offering a lower p2 and paying the smaller penalty.  If p1 is so large that no 
consumer makes any purchases in period 1, the firm will revert to offering its full-information price in 
period 2.    
Now that each type of firm's pricing rule for the period 2 subgame has been determined, 
consider period 1.  Consumers are uninformed as to the monopolist's true type at this date.  A type H 
monopolist may choose to signal its type either through price alone, or by offering a two-part signal of 
price and a MFCC.  In a separating equilibrium, the type H firm chooses m and p1 such that a type L 
firm would prefer to offer ( )0,0,0,1 Lcpp = .  Let the price offered by H in conjunction with a MFCC 
in a separating equilibrium, ,pˆ  satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint: 
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ).,,,c,,,,cp+,,,c,p
,,,c,,,,cp+
LLL
LL
ffd
d
1010001ˆ
0000001
PP
³P
 (21) 
 First consider ( )( ])1(000ˆ p,,,,cpp LLÎ ,  in which case ppp ˆ12 == . 
Proposition 1:  There exists a Cho-Kreps intuitive equilibrium outcome in which: ppp ˆ21 ==  
and m=1 for type H; )0,0,0,(21 Lcppp == for type L, where ( ])1()001ˆ p,,,,cp(p HHÎ . 
 
The proof to proposition 1 may be found in the Appendix. 
 To show that signaling with MFCC is less costly, one must first show that Pp £ˆ .  From 
Theorem 1, P  solves 
 ( )( ) ( ).,,,c,P=,,,c,,,,cp LLL 000000000 PP  (22) 
If ( )( ])1(000ˆ p,,,,cpp LLÎ , then we can rewrite equation (21) to get: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ).,,,c,p+,,,c,p=,,,c,,,,cp+1 LLLL 000ˆ001ˆ000000 PPP dd  (23) 
 
If d = 0, then P=pˆ .  If d < 0, and P=pˆ , then we can rewrite equation (23) to see that: 
 [ ]44444444 344444444 21
4444444 34444444 21
+
PP¹
PP
,,,,c,P-,,,c,,,,cp
,,,c,,,,cp-,,,c,P
LLL
LLL
)000()000)000((
)000)000(()001(
0
d
 (24) 
because ( ) ( )000001 ,,,c,P>,,,c,P LL PP .   As ( )p-P ˆ increases, both sides of equation (23) increase. 
By the single-crossing property,  
 
( ) ( )
p
,,,c,P>
p
,,,c,P> LL
¶
P¶
¶
P¶ 000001
0 , (25) 
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so the right-hand side of (23) increases faster as ( )p-P ˆ increases than the left-hand side of (23).  
Therefore, there must be some Pp £ˆ such that equation (23) is satisfied. 
We must also show that )0,0,1,(ˆ Hcpp > .  First, the following two conditions must be true for 
a profit-maximizing monopolist: 
 ,0
)0,0,1,(
1 >
¶
¶
>
c
cp H  (26) 
and 
 
( )( )
c.,<
c
,,c,,,,c,p
"
¶
P¶
0
001001
 (27) 
 
Equations (26) and (27) imply that ( ) ( )001001 ,,,cp,<,,,cp, LH PP , and ( ) ( )001001 ,,,cp>,,,cp LH .  
Equations (26) and (27) also imply that the percentage decrease in profits from a one-percent increase 
in costs is greater than the percentage decrease in profits from a one-percent increase in price (let ? * 
represent ( )( )0,0,1,,0,0,1, ccpP  and let p* represent ( )0,0,1,cp ): 
 .
p
p
->
c
c
+
c
p
p
-=
c
c
-
*
**
*
**
*
*
P¶
P¶
P
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
P¶
¶
¶
¶
P¶
P¶
P¶  (28) 
Now  pˆ  is the price greater than ( )0,0,0,Lcp  at which the functions ( )0,0,1,, LcpP  and 
( )0,0,0,, LcpP  are equidistant from the value ( )( )0,0,0,,0,0,0, LL ccpP .  By equation (28), as cH 
gets larger, the value ( )( )0,0,1,,0,0,1, HH ccpP ?  will decrease “faster” than the value  
( )0,0,1,Hcp , such that ( ) p=,,,cp H ˆ001 only when cH  is so large that 
( )( ) ( )( )0,0,0,,0,0,0,0,0,1,,0,0,1, LLHH ccpccp P<P .  However, for cH that large, no firm would 
ever consciously choose to be a high-quality firm.  Therefore, it must be that ( )001ˆ ,,,c>p H .  In other 
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words, by offering a MFCC the high quality firm can signal its quality with a price between its first-best 
price and the “next-best” price, P , from Theorem 1.  In this instance, the MFCC works to lessen the 
price distortion even though prices are the same in both periods and consumers do not receive refunds 
on their purchases.
 Figure 4 shows the relationships between the profit functions for Type L and Type H firms.  For 
a discount rate of d=1, equation (21) holds with equality at pp ˆ1 = .  As 0®d , Pp ®ˆ (from below). 
Now consider ( ])(~)(ˆ 11 bp,bpp LLÎ , in which case pp ˆ1 =  and ( )f,1,0,2 Lm cpp = . 
 
Proposition 2: There exists a Cho-Kreps intuitive equilibrium outcome in which: p=p ˆ1 , 
( )f,,,cp=p Hm 112  for type H, and  ( )00021 ,,,cp=p=p L  for type L, where ( ])1(~)1(ˆ p,pp HHÎ . 
 
The proof to Proposition 2 is in the appendix. 
 As before, one must first show that Pp £ˆ  to show that signaling with a MFCC is less costly.  
We can rewrite equation (21) to get: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).1010001ˆ000000 ffdd ,,,c,,,,cp+,,,c,p,,,c,,,,cp+1 LLLLL PP³P  (29) 
which may be further rewritten as: 
 
( )( )[ ]
( )[ ])0),,1,0,((),1,0,()0,0,0,),0,0,0,((
)0,0,0,),0,0,0,(()1,ˆ(),1,0,(ˆ1
ffd
fdd
LmLLmLL
LLLLm
cpDccpccp
ccppDccpp
--P
=P--+-
 (30) 
As d®0, equation (30) becomes identical to equation (9) and P=pˆ .   The remainder of the 
proof that Pp £ˆ is similar to the corresponding part of the proof of proposition 1.  By the single-
crossing property, it must be that only a price Pp =ˆ could satisfy equation (30). 
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It remains to be shown that ,1,0,0)cp(>p Hˆ .  For simplicity, let d=1 and rewrite equation 
(30) as: 
 
( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )01010000000
1ˆ11010
00000011010
,,,,cpDc-,,,cp-,,,c,,,,cp
=,pD-,,,,cpDc-,,,cp-
,,,c,,,,cp-,,,,cpDc-,,,cp
LmLLmLL
LmLLm
LLLmLLm
ff
ff
ff
P
P
 (31) 
 
As pˆ  gets smaller, ( ) pcp Lm ˆ,1,0, ®f , until equation (31) converges to equation (23).  Then, as in 
proposition 1, )0,0,1,(ˆ Hcpp > .  Relative to the assumptions of Proposition 1, the difference between 
pˆ and H’s first-best price may be larger here.  Just as under the conditions of Proposition 1, the high 
quality firm is able to signal its type with less price distortion by offering a MFCC.  Unlike in Proposition 
1, consumers, under these different conditions, will receive a partial refund from the high-quality firm.8  
Under the conditions of either proposition, consumers pay lower prices when the high-quality firm uses 
both price and a MFCC as a signal of quality than when the firm signals with price alone. 
                                                                 
8 The low-quality firm does not pay a penalty because it prefers to offer its full-information price in each period. 
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IV. A More General Contract 
This paper, so far, has limited the firm to a very specific penalty structure.  There are other types 
of contracts that may also offer the high-quality firm the ability to credibly signal its type to consumers at 
a lower cost than price signaling alone.  Shieh (1996) studies the use of a money-back guarantee 
(MBG) to help signal product quality.  A MBG is a warranty by which consumers receive a partial or 
full refund of the purchase price should the consumer be dissatisfied with the quality of the good, 
whether because the good is physically defective or for subjective reasons.9  Shieh shows that when 
consumers are promised a full refund should the good's quality not be as promised (in this case, a 
defective product is observed), a high-quality producer will be able to signal its type at its first-best 
price.   
There are two definitive differences between my paper and Shieh's.  We each begin by 
assuming different definitions of quality.  Shieh defines quality as the probability that a product will break 
down.  I assume that quality differences are more aesthetic.  The product works, but there may exist 
another product with attributes that the consumer desires more.  However, this assumption is not crucial 
to my model.  Allowing consumers to exercise a MBG based upon subjective measurements of quality 
may give rise to moral hazard problems (too many refunds).  When a MFCC is exercised it is 
independent of consumers' perceptions of quality.  The MFCC penalty is only paid when the 
                                                                 
9MFCCs are different from MBGs in the type of protection offered the consumer and how that protection is 
triggered.  MBGs protect the consumer from being dissatisfied with the good itself.  Retroactive MFCCs protect the 
consumer from suffering "buyer's remorse" when they find that after purchase, a good has gone on sale at a later 
date.  The consumer of a good with MFCC protection need not be dissatisfied with the good he has purchased -- 
insofar as the good is not defective -- except that he has paid too high a price for it and could have waited to 
purchase it at a lower price. 
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low-quality firm lowers its price, which it must in order to make any sales after it has been discovered 
mimicking a high-quality firm. 
The second distinction between my paper and Shieh's may be found in the results.  While 
MFCCs and MBGs are different contracts, they are both capable of allowing producers of high-quality 
goods to signal their quality with reduced price distortion.  Under either type of contract, low-quality 
producers are unable to afford the associated penalty.10 MBG protection, in the form of a full refund, 
fully eliminates the price distortion.  MFCC protection, a partial refund, partially eliminates price 
distortion. 
What is important for reduced-distortion signaling, however, is not the specific terms of the 
contract, but that there is an enforceable penalty imposed upon the low-quality producer for mimicking 
a high-quality firm.  The following analysis shows that there is a more general form of contractual penalty 
with which the high-quality monopolist can signal its type without price distortion.  MBGs and MFCCs 
are variants of this general contract. 
All that is necessary for "cost-less signaling" is for the contract to be somehow tied to some 
measurement (i.e. through either price or observable quality) of the firm's performance and that the 
penalty be sufficiently large.  From equation (10), period two profits are 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .m-b,pDc-p=,m,b,c,p ii ff 1222122P  (32) 
where f >0 is the penalty paid per-unit of the product sold and m1Î{0, 1} is the (observable) trigger 
variable which determines if the penalty goes into effect.   The penalty, which is now an endogenous 
                                                                 
10 In Shieh's paper, the probability of a product being returned for full refund is too high for a low-quality 
manufacturer to offer MBG protection.  In my model, the penalty associated with lowering prices once quality 
becomes known is too great for the low-quality firm to offer price protection. 
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variable, may be triggered by some measurable standard, whether it be price or observable quality (a 
breakdown). 
For the penalty to induce distortion-free signaling, the first-period price will be ,1,0,0)cp(p H=1 .  
The incentive compatibility constraint, equation (21) will become 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) dfdd --+P³P+ 0,0,0,1,,0,0,1,0,0,0,,0,0,0,)1( 22 pDcpccpccp LLHLL . (33) 
 Suppose the penalty were ( )111 ,bpDp=f , which is equivalent to a money-back guarantee, 
but is triggered when 12 pp < , like a MFCC.  The type L firm’s optimal price in the second period is 
( )0,0,0,Lcp  (the size of the penalty is independent of p2).  Therefore, equation (33) may be rewritten 
as 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0,0,1,,0,0,1,11,0,0,1,0,0,0,,0,0,0, LHHLLL ccpcpDcccp P-³+P dd . (34) 
Provided that the discount factor, d, is large enough, equation (34) will be satisfied.  This more general 
contract, which is a hybrid of an MFCC and MBG, allows distortion-free signaling. 
 
V. Conclusion
Best-price guarantees can be an effective signal of a product's quality.  A low-quality producer will 
find that offering a MFCC is unprofitable -- it must be able to lower prices or else face reduced sales in the 
second period.  A high-quality producer finds that it can signal its quality with less price distortion than if it 
had not offered a best-price contract.  Since the contract credibly restricts the firm's actions, consumers 
know that only a high-quality producer can afford to offer a MFCC.  The similarities between Shieh's paper 
and my own indicate that there exists a more general type of commitment guarantee, one in which the firm 
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offers explicitly to pay consumers if the firm misrepresents its type.  There is some size of monetary 
non-performance payment for which a high-quality firm will be able to offer its first-best price.  
Contrary to some of the previous literature on best-price guarantees, social welfare should be 
greater when MFCCs are used as a signal of quality because prices are lower and output is higher than 
without the contract.  In both Cooper (1986) and Butz (1991), MFCCs allow firms to charge higher prices 
and restrict output.  If best-price guarantees are not always harmful to social welfare then these contracts 
should be dealt with on a case by case basis by antitrust authorities.  Further, empirical research into the 
effects of best-price guarantees upon competition may shed additional light into how judges and the antitrust 
agencies should properly treat these contracts. 
 
VI. Appendix  
Proposition 1:  There exists a Cho-Kreps intuitive equilibrium outcome in which: 
ppp ˆ21 ==  and m=1 for type H; )0,0,0,(21 Lcppp == for type L, where 
( ])1()001ˆ p,,,,cp(p HHÎ . 
Proof: 
 In a separating equilibrium, type L does not distort its price, )0,0,0,(21 Lcppp == , or its 
choice of m.  The price set by the type H firm must solve the incentive compatibility constraint, equation 
(23): 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ).,,,c,p+,,,c,p=,,,c,,,,cp+1 LLLL 000ˆ001ˆ000000 PPP dd  (23) 
 
The type L firm is indifferent between mimicking its type H counterpart and offering its own full-
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information price and MFCC choice when the type H firm sets its price according to this constraint. 
 However, the incentive compatibility constraint may also be met if the type H firm offers a first-
period price that is lower than its full-information price.  However, this lower price is  
P  from equation (9).  From Theorem 1, we already know that the type H firm strictly prefers P  to P . 
 It remains to be shown that the type H firm will prefer pˆ  to P . 
 The type H firm must do at least as well by charging ppp ˆ21 ==  and offering a MFCC in 
equilibrium as it would have done by signaling using a higher first period price, P  and no MFCC: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )001,ˆ1001,)001()001( ,,c,p,,c,,,,cp,,,c,P HHHH P+£P+P dd  (A1)  
Equation (A1) may be rewritten as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).1,ˆˆ1),001()001(
1,1,ˆˆ
pDcp,,,cpDc,,,cp
PDcPpDcp
HHHH
HH
---
³---
dd
 (A2) 
Using equations (9) and (23), we get the following equality: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0,ˆˆ1,ˆˆ1,1 pDcppDcpPDcP LLL -+-=-+ dd  (A3) 
Substitute equation (A3) into equation (A2) to get 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0,ˆˆ1,
1,ˆˆ1),001()001(
1,ˆˆ1,1,1,ˆˆ
pDcpPDcP
pDcp,,,cpDc,,,cp
pDcpPDcPPDcPpDcp
LL
HHHH
LLHH
-+--
---
³---+---
dd
dd  (A4) 
Equation (A4) may be simplified and rewritten as: 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ].000,)000(001,)001(
000,ˆ001,ˆ
1,1,ˆ
1
,,c,,,,cp,,c,,,,cp
,,c,p,,c,p
PDpDcc
LLHH
LH
LH
P-P
-P-P
£--
d
 (A5) 
Consider each term in equation (A5).  The left-hand side is positive – 
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[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 01,1,ˆ1 >-- PDpDcc LHd  as cH > cL and Pp <ˆ .  Both bracketed terms on the right-hand 
side are also positive.  Also, the entire right-hand side is positive.  This is easily seen by rewriting the 
right-hand side of (A5) as follows: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).001,ˆ001,)001(
000,ˆ000,)000(
,,c,p,,c,,,,cp
,,c,p,,c,,,,cp
HHH
LLL
P-P
>P-P
 (A6) 
The price pˆ is closer to type H’s full-information monopoly price than to type L’s full-information price, 
so the profit distortion is greater for type L than for type H.   
 Let d* be the discount factor such that equation (A5) holds with equality – that is for d= d*, the 
type H firm is indifferent between charging ppp ˆ21 ==  with an offer of a MFCC and instead charging 
)001(21 ,,,cp=p,P=p H  with no MFCC offer.  For d> d
*, the type H firm strictly prefers to offer a 
MFCC and charges ppp ˆ21 == . 
 There is no type of informed player that could not benefit from an out-of-equilibrium action 
irrespective of uninformed consumers’ beliefs.  That is, there exists at least one set of beliefs that 
consumers might hold for which either the type L firm or the type H firm would find it profitable make an 
out-of-equilibrium move.  The Intuitive Criterion of Cho & Kreps (1987) specifies then that consumers’ 
beliefs about the identity of the informed player that takes an out-of-equilibrium action must be 
concentrated upon the type L and type H firms.  Let consumers (who are uninformed) believe that any 
out-of-equilibrium move in period 1 is made by the type L firm with probability one.  More formally, 
 
[ )
ïî
ï
í
ì Î"
=
.otherwise1
,ˆ,0
1
pPp
b  (A7) 
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 The type L firm cannot profitably deviate from its full-information price, ( )0,0,0,Lcp , in the 
first-period given uninformed consumers’ beliefs.  By equations (9) and (23), the type L firm will strictly 
prefer ( )0,0,0,Lcp  to any pp ˆ> or any Pp <  even though consumers’ beliefs are most favorable at 
these prices.  Similarly, when consumers’ beliefs are least favorable, the type L firm will strictly prefer 
( )0,0,0,Lcp  to any other [ )pPp ˆ,Î . 
 The type H firm cannot profitably deviate from offering the price pp ˆ1 =  given uninformed 
consumers’ beliefs if d³ d*.  By equation (A5), pˆ is more profitable than P  
and therefore, also any price Pp > .  The type H firm will also strictly prefer  
pˆ to any [ )pPp ˆ,Î , where consumers’ beliefs are unfavorable.   Therefore, given consumers’ beliefs 
concerning an out-of-equilibrium action, neither type of firm will deviate from the equilibrium and the 
equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion of Cho & Kreps.  QED   
 
Proposition 2: There exists a Cho-Kreps intuitive equilibrium outcome in which: 
( )f,,,cp=p,p=p Hm 11ˆ 21  for type H, and  ( )00021 ,,,cp=p=p L  for type L, where 
( ])1(~)1(ˆ p,pp HHÎ . 
Proof: 
 In a separating equilibrium, type L does not distort its price, ( )00021 ,,,cp=p=p L , or its 
choice of m.  The price set by the type H firm must solve the incentive compatibility constraint, equation 
(29): 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).1010001ˆ000000 ffdd ,,,c,,,,cp+,,,c,p,,,c,,,,cp+1 LLLLL PP³P  (29) 
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The type L firm is indifferent between mimicking its type H counterpart and offering its own full-
information price and MFCC choice when the type H firm sets its price according to this constraint. 
 However, the incentive compatibility constraint may also be met if the type H firm offers a first-
period price that is lower than its full-information price.  However, this lower price is  
P  from equation (9).  From Theorem 1, we already know that the type H firm strictly prefers  
P  to P .  It remains to be shown that the type H firm will prefer pˆ to P .. 
 The type H firm must do at least as well by charging ( )f,,,cp=p,p=p Hm 11ˆ 21 and offering a 
MFCC in equilibrium as it would have done by signaling using a higher first period price, P  and no 
MFCC: 
( ) ( ) ( )ffdd ,1,1,),,1,1,(001,ˆ001,)001()001( HHmHHHH ccp,,c,p,,c,,,,cp,,,c,P P+P£P+P  (A8) 
Equation (A8) may be rewritten as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ).1,ˆ),1,1,(ˆ
1),1,1,(),1,1,(1),001()001(
1,1,ˆˆ
,
pDcpp
cpDccp,,,cpDc,,,cp
PDcPpDcp
Hm
HmHHmHHH
HH
fd
ffdd
-+
--
³---
-  (A9) 
Using equations (9) and (29), we get the following equality: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1,ˆ),1,0,(ˆ
0),,1,0,(),1,0,(
1,ˆˆ1,1
pDcpp
cpDccp
pDcpPDcP
Lm
LmLLm
LL
f
ffd
d
--
-+
-=-+
 (A10) 
Substitute equation (A10) into equation (A9) to get 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1,ˆ),1,1,(ˆ011),1,1,(
1,1,ˆ),1,1,(ˆ
),1,1,11,1),001()001(
1,ˆˆ1,1,1,ˆˆ
1,,(),(
pDcppf ),,,,(cpDcp
PDcPpDcpp
cDcc,,,cpDc,,,cp
pDcpPDcPPDcPpDcp
HmHmHm
LHm
HHHHHH
LLHH
m
p
m
p
fdfd
dfd
ffdd
--+
---+
--
³---+---
-
 (A11) 
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Recalling that  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1,ˆ),1,1,(ˆ1),,1,1,(),1,1,(
,1,1,),,1,1,(
pDcppcpDccp
ccp
HmHmHHm
HHm
fff
ff
---
=P
 (A12) 
and 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1,ˆ),1,0,(ˆ0),,1,0,(),1,0,(
,1,0,),,1,0,(
pDcppcpDccp
ccp
LmLmLLm
LLm
fff
ff
---
=P
 (A13) 
equation (A11) may be simplified and rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )( ) ( )( )[ ].0,0,0,,0,0,0,0,0,1,,0,0,1,
,1,0,,,1,0,,1,1,,,1,1,
1,1,ˆ
LLHH
LLmHHm
LH
ccpccp
ccpccp
PDpDcc
P-P
-P-P
£--
d
ffffd  (A14) 
Consider each term in equation (A14).  The left-hand side is positive—
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01,1,ˆ >-- PDpDcc LH —as LH cc >  and Pp <ˆ .  Both bracketed terms on the right-hand 
side are also positive.  Also, the entire right-hand side is positive.  This is easily seen by rewriting the 
right-hand side of (A14) as follows: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ).,1,1,,,1,1,0,0,1,,0,0,1,
,1,0,,,1,0,0,0,0,,0,0,0,
ff
ff
HHmHH
LLmLL
ccpccp
ccpccp
P-P
>P-P
 (A15)  
 The price ( )f,1,1,Hm cp  is closer to type H’s full-information monopoly price than  
( )f,1,0,Lm cp  is to type L’s full-information price.  Also, the penalty paid by the type L firm is greater 
than the penalty paid by the type H firm – the type H firm need not lower price as much in period two 
as the type L firm must.  Therefore, the profit distortion is greater for type L than for type H.   
 Let d** be the discount factor such that equation (A14) holds with equality – that is for d=d** , 
the type H firm is indifferent between charging ( )f,1,1,,ˆ 21 Hm cpppp ==  with an offer of a MFCC 
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and instead charging ( )0,0,1,, 21 HcppPp ==  with no MFCC offer.  For d>d**, the type H firm 
strictly prefers to offer a MFCC and charge ( )f,1,1,,ˆ 21 Hm cpppp == . 
 There is no type of informed player that could not benefit from an out-of-equilibrium action 
irrespective of uninformed consumers’ beliefs.  That is, there exists at least one set of beliefs that 
consumers might hold for which either the type L firm or the type H firm would find it profitable make an 
out-of-equilibrium move.  The Intuitive Criterion of Cho & Kreps (1987) specifies then that consumers’ 
beliefs about the identity of the informed player that takes an out-of-equilibrium action must be 
concentrated upon the type L and type H firms.  Let consumers (who are uninformed) believe that any 
out-of-equilibrium move in period 1 is made by the type L firm with probability one.  More formally, 
 
[ )
ïî
ï
í
ì Î"
=
.otherwise1
,ˆ,0
1
pPp
b  (A16) 
 The type L firm cannot profitably deviate from its full-information price, ( )0,0,0,Lcp , in the 
first-period given uninformed consumers’ beliefs.  By equations (9) and (29), the type L firm will strictly 
prefer ( )0,0,0,Lcp  to any pp ˆ>  or any Pp <  even though consumers’ beliefs are most favorable at 
these prices.  Similarly, when consumers’ beliefs are least favorable, the type L firm will strictly prefer 
( )0,0,0,Lcp  to any other [ )pPp ˆ,Î . 
 The type H firm cannot profitably deviate from offering the price pp ˆ1 =  given uninformed 
consumers’ beliefs if d³d***.  By equation (A14), pˆ  is more profitable than  
P and therefore, also any price Pp >ˆ .  The type H firm will also strictly prefer  
pˆ to any [ )pPp ˆ,Î , where consumers’ beliefs are unfavorable.  Therefore, given consumers’ beliefs 
concerning an out-of-equilibrium action, neither type of firm will deviate from the equilibrium and the 
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equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion of Cho & Kreps.  QED  
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Figure 1 -- Profits under Linear Demand
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Figure 2 -- Profits under Constant Elasticity Demand Curve
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Figure 3-- Period 2 price as a function of period one price for type L firm 
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Figure 4 -- Profit functions under linear demand
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